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ABSTRACT. As large-scale environmental disasters become increasingly frequent and more severe globally, people and organizations
that prepare for and respond to these crises need efficient and effective ways to integrate sound science into their decision making.
Experience has shown that integrating nongovernmental scientific expertise into disaster decision making can improve the quality of
the response, and is most effective if  the integration occurs before, during, and after a crisis, not just during a crisis. However, collaboration
between academic, government, and industry scientists, decision makers, and responders is frequently difficult because of cultural
differences, misaligned incentives, time pressures, and legal constraints. Our study addressed this challenge by using the Deep Change
Method, a design methodology developed by Stanford ChangeLabs, which combines human-centered design, systems analysis, and
behavioral psychology. We investigated underlying needs and motivations of government agency staff  and academic scientists, mapped
the root causes underlying the relationship failures between these two communities based on their experiences, and identified leverage
points for shifting deeply rooted perceptions that impede collaboration. We found that building trust and creating mutual value between
multiple stakeholders before crises occur is likely to increase the effectiveness of problem solving. We propose a solution, the Science
Action Network, which is designed to address barriers to scientific collaboration by providing new mechanisms to build and improve
trust and communication between government administrators and scientists, industry representatives, and academic scientists. The
Science Action Network has the potential to ensure cross-disaster preparedness and science-based decision making through novel
partnerships and scientific coordination.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental disasters are becoming increasingly more frequent
and severe globally (IPCC 2012). Although those who respond
to disasters (“responders”) continue to improve their preparation
for and response to crises, integrating the best available scientific
information and expertise is vital for efficient and effective
decision making (Lubchenco et al. 2012). Yet how scientific
information and expertise is incorporated into decision-making
processes in the United States is challenging because industry and
governmental decision makers, often from multiple agencies,
operate on different systems of rules and rewards across agencies
and compared with academic institutions (Janssen et al. 2010).
Our results indicate these disparities must be addressed to improve
effective collaboration, and response should be informed by an
understanding of the complex human behaviors that are present
during crises.  
Human-centered design is a problem-solving methodology that
focuses on the needs and behaviors of stakeholders who are either
driving the problem or have the authority to enact interventions
(Giacomin 2014). By comparison, systems thinking is a set of
synergistic analytic skills used to improve the capability of
identifying and understanding systems as sets of dynamic
interdependent relationships, predicting their behaviors over time,
and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired
effects (Arnold and Wade 2015). The systems thinking approach
contrasts with traditional analysis, which studies systems by
breaking them down into their separate elements. When human-
centered design is strategically integrated with systems thinking,
it is uniquely suited to address complex problems. Importantly,
this integrated design process is not a science, but rather a method
of iteratively framing, understanding, and deconstructing
human-system challenges (Brown 2008). We present a
methodology for applying human-centered design and systems
thinking to crisis preparedness and response, demonstrate how
this methodology is applicable to other social and environmental
challenges, and propose a solution, the Science Action Network.  
Despite the increasing popularity of human-centered design, or
“design thinking,” across a number of fields, its methodology
remains a relatively neglected area of research as applied to
environmental challenges (Razzouk and Shute 2012, Santo et al.
2015, Sorice and Donlan 2015). We explore the convergence of
human-centered design and systems thinking (henceforth called
the Deep Change Method) as tools for tackling complex problems
rooted in human behavior (Brown and Wyatt 2010). Also referred
to as systemic design, this intersection “brings human-centered
design to complex, multi-stakeholder service systems” (Jones
2014:93). Both human-centered design and systems thinking have
received attention as potent tools for addressing current societal
problems, but literature on the coapplication of these methods is
scarce (Jones 2014). The Deep Change Method, created by
Stanford ChangeLabs, combines the two methods into a formal,
cohesive process for addressing complex systems challenges and
producing scalable interventions (Banerjee 2014). We define a
complex system as a set of elements interconnected in such a way
that they produce their own internal dynamics that are difficult
to understand, predict, manage, and/or change (Magee and De
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Weck 2004, Meadows and Wright 2008). Thus, designing an
intervention for changing how system components interact
requires the integration of multiple stakeholder perspectives, and
a high level of comfort with developing and testing solutions in
the face of uncertainty and continually shifting system dynamics.
Deepwater Horizon as a complex system challenge
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster (DWH, 2010) was the
largest marine oil spill, and the largest mobilization of resources
to address an environmental emergency, in U.S. history
(Lubchenco et al. 2012). DWH was an unprecedented disaster:
oil spilled for 87 days in an extreme ocean environment, spreading
rapidly throughout the water column and to the atmosphere. The
constantly changing crisis presented novel policy challenges and
required unprecedented engagement and collaboration among
scientists from multiple disciplines across government, academia,
and industry (Lubchenco et al. 2012, McNutt et al. 2012).  
Large oil spills, like many environmental challenges, are often
classified as “wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber 1973,
Buchanan 1992). Wicked problems are extremely difficult to solve
and are characterized by a lack of information, overlapping and
difficult-to-map drivers, and conflicting value systems among
actors (Rittel and Webber 1973, Buchanan 1992). More than six
factors contributed to DWH being a wicked problem. First, DWH
was the largest marine oil spill in U.S. history and its geographic
breadth, the far-reaching impacts, and the urgency of the response
were unprecedented (Mabus 2010). Second, there were many
unknown unknowns, e.g., the flow rate of oil egressing from the
damaged well, affecting multiple dimensions of the response.
Third, complex dynamics within and between stakeholders
affected the response, where traditional stakeholders, e.g.,
multiple federal and state authorities and a designated responsible
party, engaged with new stakeholders, including academic
scientists. The convergence of different missions, cultures, and
perceptions posed coordination challenges. These differences
were sometimes magnified by 24/7 media coverage, which
introduced additional pressure to the stakeholders (National
Commission 2011). Fourth, human cognitive bias known as
“discounting,” i.e., prioritizing the acquisition of present and
near-term rewards rather than longer term, potentially greater
rewards, negatively affected the amount of organizational,
financial, and human resources invested in sustainable long-term
solutions. Fifth, the diversity of actors who became involved in
the response reported to different authorities, some outside the
National Contingency Plan, contributing to confusion and
communication challenges. Sixth, governmental, industry,
academic, and public interests had overlapping priorities, yet
differing levels of ability to solve the problems that emerged
during the disaster (Lubchenco et al. 2012). Finally, extrinsic
factors further influenced and complicated the implementation
of solutions, including funding constraints, legal restrictions, and
bureaucracy.  
In examining the diverse scientific, social, and institutional
complexities that amplified the challenge of responding to DWH,
crisis decision makers consistently identify cross-sectoral
collaboration as one of the most critical challenges that, if
addressed, could greatly improve the social and ecological
outcomes of future environmental crises (Lubchenco et al. 2012,
McNutt et al. 2012). DWH revealed the wealth of science and
technology resources available within the broader scientific
community, their strong desire to help, and how crises can spur
the rapid advancement of valuable new scientific knowledge. Yet
it also exposed weaknesses in the system of information
dissemination and exchange among scientists from those three
sectors (Machlis and McNutt 2011, Lubchenco et al. 2012).
Traditional communication mechanisms, affected by policy,
previous experience, and culture, constrained the sharing of
information between responders and the broader scientific
community. Lack of communication across sectors and legal
constraints complicated collaboration and the ability of academic
scientists to rapidly mobilize, assist with spill response, and
evaluate the potential social-ecological impacts. In the words of
one scientist interviewed as part of this project and who was
involved in DWH: “The many stakeholders involved did not share
a common language, timeframe, set of values, or pre-existing
relationships.” The lessons learned from prior spills such as Exxon
Valdez (1989) were helpful, but ultimately did not create an
effective infrastructure to support rapid collaboration among
federal, industry, and academic scientists during a future spill. In
addition, the unique nature of DWH being the first spill to occur
at significant depth (~1500m below the sea surface) introduced
new response challenges.
Systems thinking to tackle complex environmental challenges
Wicked problem characteristics are common across complex
environmental problems, including climate change, extractive
resource use, and biodiversity loss (Levin et al. 2012). The Deep
Change Method is uniquely suited to address these problems
because it considers (1) system complexity, (2) behavioral
psychology of human stakeholders, and (3) adaptability for
unknown unknowns (Banerjee 2015). When designers use a
systems thinking lens, they can decipher interventions that will
impact complex, multistakeholder challenges. Both human-
centered design and systems thinking can be applied to any human
experience to solve wicked problems within and across subjects,
putting human behaviors that drive the problem, and are
necessary for sustainably solving the problem, at the center of the
process (Buchanan 1992). Contrary to some science disciplines
that use linear processes to distill deterministic components of a
problem and a solution, a design process assumes nonlinearity
and unpredictable system dynamics. It is structured to yield
previously unknown solutions, solutions that have not yet been
previously generated or applied to the problem. The Deep Change
Method, like other design methods, explicitly avoids taking any
single disciplinary approach, and instead employs tools that
integrate multiple points of view to address seemingly intractable
challenges.  
Using the Deep Change Method in the context of environmental
disasters presents an opportunity: How might we design a
solution to the relationship failures that emerge in high-stress,
high-stakes disasters? We pinpoint why and how design research
and the Deep Change Method can be leveraged to address diverse
and complex environmental problems. Specifically, we present a
series of methods applied to the challenge of scientific
collaboration before, during, and after environmental crises,
specifically focusing on large oils spills such as DWH.
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METHODOLOGY
Our process consisted of six phases: challenge framing,
ethnography, synthesis, concept generation and idea selection,
prototyping, and testing and solution refinement (Fig. 1), using
oil spills as our test case. These six phases map to the phases
included in the human-centered design process and the Deep
Change Method (Brown 2009, Banerjee 2015). However, we adapt
them here based on the time frame and scope of our project
challenge. Throughout the process, we hosted in-person
workshops and conference calls with a group of advisors with
broad experience with DWH and other environmental crises
across government agencies and academia to guide our design.
We had four target outcomes for the project focused on
environmental response and remediation (instead of the
engineering challenges posed by deep-water drilling, such as
source containment and kill operations): (1) minimum oil exists
in the marine and coastal environments because responders
prevent or stop the flow of oil and/or released oil is contained;
(2) the environmental and human impacts of the oil spill are
mitigated through preparation, response, and/or restoration; (3)
response efforts in future large oil spills are effective and efficient
in achieving harm reduction goals; and (4) increased scientific
understanding of environmental and human health impacts of
an oil spill improve long-term ecosystem management. During
concept generation and solution refinement, we vetted our
material against these target outcomes, which provided the basis
for excluding or including insights and ideas intended to address
the challenge. For example, we rated how shifting a set of
incentives or behaviors would likely impact each target outcome
and then prioritize ideas that scored highly across all four.
Preliminary challenge framing
At the beginning of a design project, the challenge framing should
be broad enough to allow the project team to discover areas of
unexpected value (Seelig 2012). Our initial framing centered on
the question of how we might enable “effective, scientific
communication between academic scientists and federal
responders during large oil spill crises.” During preliminary
challenge framing, we mapped the federal and state government
and academic actors and resources for disaster preparedness and
response, including the flow of funding, information, and
partnerships. These maps helped us identify where new solutions
were most critical. The exercise also expanded our understanding
of the complex and overlapping drivers that influenced human
relationships during DWH. As a result of the insights gathered
during this preliminary stage, the final challenge framing was then
revised and refined after the design ethnography stage.
Ethnography
During ethnography, a process to observe and understand the
users for whom researchers are designing, two of the authors and
members of the internal project team (Mease and Gibbs-Plessl)
identified stakeholder interviewees. These stakeholder groups
were identified during pilot interviews and through a review of
the literature on preparedness and response structures. This
project identified several types of stakeholders involved in the
response and recovery from Deepwater Horizon: academic
scientists, government scientists, industry scientists, responders,
and government administrators. Key stakeholders included those
(1) that directly influenced the relationship failures that occurred
between government administrators and responders, government
scientists, and academic scientists; (2) who had decision-making
authority within the government or academic structures that our
project sought to assess, e.g., elected or appointed officials,
university deans; and/or (3) whose work was hampered by
insufficient scientific support during the disaster response cycle,
e.g., local nongovernmental organizations.
Fig. 1. The convergent (synthesizing insights) and divergent
(exploring new pathways for framing the problem and
generating solutions) phases of the Deep Change Method. The
recursive arrows emphasize the iterative, nonlinear nature of
the method. Challenge framing: Develop problem frames, a
theory of change, and associated target outcomes.
Ethnography: Conduct in-depth interviews and observation of
key system stakeholders to understand their roles, power,
motivations, and behaviors. Synthesis: Articulate system and
stakeholder behavior, resources flows, barriers, opportunities,
and leverage points. Concept generation: Generate a short list
of intervention concepts that are leveraged and have the
potential to create large-scale impact. Prototyping: Flesh out
concepts through experience design, iterative prototyping, and
field-testing. Select 1-2 strategies to test. Testing & Solution
refinement: Refine the strategic and tactical elements of the
intervention experience, including scaling, diffusion, evaluation,
and measurement strategies. Finalize a implementation plan
and test with key stakeholders.
The internal project team conducted semistructured phone
interviews with 72 stakeholders including academic scientists,
government agency staff, elected officials, and industry
representatives, (Fig. 2). The interviews included narrative-style
questions similar to vignettes in sociological research (Bloor and
Wood 2006) to elicit feelings and underlying interests within
disaster scenarios. The majority of the questions were structured
to identify the goals, motivations, and perceptions of the
respondents to contribute to our understanding of the needs and
mindsets driving their behavior (Table A1.1). One researcher
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conducted the interview while a second researcher took detailed
notes. Finally, the team used existing literature on scientific crisis
preparation and response from other disaster types to guide our
ethnography process, such as research on the science community’s
engagement during influenza pandemics and the Fukushima
nuclear meltdown, as well as the broader literature on crisis
communication.
Fig. 2. The number of interviewees across each target
stakeholder group: government; nongovernmental
environmental organizations, including independent research
institutions, advocacy NGOs, and consultants; local academics,
working at an academic institution in the Gulf of Mexico;
nonlocal academics; and industry. The second annulus graph
represents a breakdown of the 35 interviewees working in
federal government agencies.
Synthesis and final challenge framing
The internal project team used a postinterview capture form to
interpret and synthesize the insights from the interviews. The form
captured a range of information: compelling insights, challenge
framing, primary responsibilities of the interviewee, resources
controlled, self-perceived agency of decision making in a response
situation, relationship with other system stakeholders, key
underlying emotions communicated, role in the system,
familiarity with existing solutions, and potential new solutions
envisioned for the project challenge. From this information, we
created persona profiles for four primary stakeholders: (1)
academic scientist local to the disaster site, i.e., working at an
academic institution in the state affected by the disaster, (2)
academic scientist not local to disaster site, (3) U.S. Coast Guard
administrator, and (4) National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Scientific-Support Coordinator. These
profiles included the stakeholders’ motivations and goals,
intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to their agency, and dominant
perceptions of other primary stakeholders (Fig. A1.1). Human-
centered design often employs user personas to connect solutions
to user needs refined from ethnography, and have been shown to
improve the usability of final design products (Long 2009). In this
study, persona profiles served as generalized, fictitious
representations of stakeholders the project team could reference
to guide evaluation of stakeholder needs, motivations, and
behaviors.  
From final challenge framing, shaped by interviewees, we
constructed a root cause map. Root cause analysis investigates
and links observable phenomena to underlying drivers.
Addressing root causes can mitigate negative cascading effects
and amplify positive impacts. We used the online concept
mapping software Kumu (https://kumu.io/) to link the drivers of
the challenge to each other and order them hierarchically, to
visually depict the dominant root causes adjacent to one another
in a tree format (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. An example root cause tree that illustrates how asking
“why” many times yields a causal chain with a leverage point at
the end node that, if  shifted, will influence all of the drivers in
the proceeding nodes. This tree has been truncated; there may
be additional nodes bifurcating from each node.
Following root cause analysis, we identified the leverage points
within the system of oil spill preparation and response, and
associated nongovernmental, e.g., academic and industry, science
(Table 1). Leverage points are places within a complex system
where a small change in one component will produce a large
change across the system (Meadows and Wright 2008). After
creating a list of hypothesized leverage points (Table A1.2), we
narrowed our focus points based on the following criteria: (1)
impact (shifting this leverage point will create significant positive
results across the four desired outcomes), (2) feasibility (the
leverage point can be effectively shifted within 1–5 years with
existing resources and minimal funding), and (3) scalability (the
leverage point applies to other scales and types of disaster
response situations). The team mapped the resulting strategic
leverage points onto the root cause map to identify interventions
that also address root causes. This process enables a design team
to revisit the preliminary challenge framing and tighten it to reflect
the critical root causes and stakeholder needs discovered through
design ethnography.  
We also referenced written material and distilled insights from
interviews with stakeholders from analog challenge contexts.
Analogs are systems that mirror a key component of the target
system, and from which designers can derive ideas and reframe
the problem. An example of an analog system is the public health
disaster response for Ebola and H1N1 and their respective
patterns in resource mobilization and allocation.
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Table 1. System leverage points used to identify priority root causes for intervention.
 
Leverage Point (in increasing
order of effectiveness)
Definition Examples
The size of buffers Buffers maintain system stability; the
larger the buffer the more a system can
withstand a shock.
The magnitude of academic scientific interest in spill research between
crises (e.g., bolstering research interest between spills, rather than letting it
oscillate drastically between large spill events) provides a buffer around the
relative scientific demands of any one crisis.
The lengths of response delays,
relative to the rate of system
change
Key time delays before or during the
response that were barriers to the
desired outcomes.
The communication of research needs from responders to academic
scientists during oil spills; the length of the peer-review process slows rapid
application of research findings to decision making.
Negative feedback loops Negative feedback loops before and
during the response that hindered the
desired outcomes.
Intense media coverage during large disasters creates a pressure on
politicians, responders, and scientists to have firm and unwavering,
“sound-byte” positions. This degrades efforts at collaboration between
stakeholder groups.
Positive feedback loops Positive loops before and during the
response that helped the desired
outcomes.
Some scientists who became involved in the response efforts were able to
build long-term relationships with responders, leading to sustained
collaboration before and during subsequent incidents.
Mindsets and perceptions Mindsets held by key stakeholders that
inform their behavior.
Discounting of future disasters by agencies, academic scientists, industry,
and the public.
The rules of the system Governing rules of the system across
geographies and time scales.
The prescribed structure of area, regional, and national contingency plans.
The goals of the system Overarching system goals (often not
directly stated) that define institutional
and individual stakeholder behavior.
The goal of extracting oil.
Concept generation and idea selection
To generate solutions to the science collaboration challenges that
emerge during large environmental disasters, the team identified
concept generation prompts based on the strategic synthesis of
the ethnography findings. Where root causes overlapped with
system leverage points, the team constructed “How Might We”
statements. How Might We statements frame a challenge as
surmountable and spur the design team to generate a wide range
of possible solutions through brainstorming. For example, the
root cause of “academic scientists and government staff  do not
codevelop priority research questions between crisis events” is an
example of a “length of delays, relative to the rate of system
change” leverage point (the delay in the communication of
research needs from responders to academic scientists during oil
spills). The corresponding How Might We statement was “How
might we enhance academic participation in preparedness and
contingency planning?” For the root cause of “a lack of consistent
scientific interest in applied spill response research,” the leverage
point is the “size of buffers” (increased buffer of time around spill
response research between spills), and the How Might We is “How
might we create long term funding cycles for oil response
research?”  
The internal project team and a group of 15 expert project
advisors (including coauthors Reddy, Ludwig, and Lubchenco)
conducted concept generation during a two-day in-person
workshop, generating 15 solution ideas. The internal project team
then brainstormed over 50 additional ideas, based on the system
leverage points. The 15 project advisors scored the solution ideas
across four criteria: impact, feasibility, novelty, and applicability
to other disaster types (on a scale of 1–5). Based on this scoring,
three ideas were selected to prototype. Novelty was evaluated to
gauge the innovation potential of the idea, as an indicator of
shifting a system from its status quo.
Prototyping
The internal project team built three prototypes to test in-person
with a broader group of users at the 2015 Gulf Oil Spill and
Ecosystem Science Conference in Houston Texas, attended by
individuals across the target stakeholder groups. A prototype is
an early model of a concept, process, or product developed to
explore and test its efficacy in achieving the desired design
outcomes (Brown 2009). For example, at the conference, the
primary prototyping tool that was used was a “user journey
scenario,” presented in the form of an interactive printed booklet.
The prototypes were scenario-based and walked users through an
experience flow of their imagined role in the new crisis decision-
making system and the change in their behavior if  the solution’s
value was realized. The booklets solicited interaction through
periodic reflection questions, both written and through verbal
discussion with surrounding participants. Prototyping is useful
for testing specific hypotheses about the value that a proposed
solution is designed to create. Prototypes allow designers to
incorporate user feedback quickly, iteratively, and inexpensively.
Prototyping also helps designers identify how real-world human
or system constraints compromise an idea’s integrity.
Importantly, prototypes often start conversations with potential
users that uncover additional insights and help inform improved
solutions.  
During the group workshop at the conference, 36 participants
were arranged into multistakeholder tables (academic scientists,
responders, and oil industry reps) to facilitate cross-sector
dialogue. The participants were guided through the interactive
booklets, which posed the storyline, hypothetical decisions, and
potential rewards associated with each idea. We collected the
participant feedback through audio recording and transcription
of the participant conversations and captured written feedback
each participant provided in the interactive booklets. Additional
prototyping feedback was received from individual 30- to 75-
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minute conversations with academic and government
stakeholders at the conference. We synthesized this feedback to
refine the solution structure of all three prototypes.
Testing and solution refinement
The last phase of the design process was to select and refine a
single proposed solution based on prototyping and testing the
solution with key system stakeholders. This phase also included
implementation planning and identified target outcomes for the
proposed solution. Importantly, during the testing phase
designers must remain curious and open to user feedback as they
continue to refine the quality and power of the proposed solution.
Because a greater diversity and number of users are engaged,
designers continually enhance the robustness of the idea,
tweaking the solution to serve the needs and create additional
value for stakeholders.  
The internal project team tested the final solution idea through
one- to two-hour long phone interviews with 45 system
stakeholders and seven webinar presentations. The proposed
solution was described in detail, highlighting the value created for
a variety of users and the structural components that underpin
the solution’s feasibility, impact, and scalability. We asked
scenario questions to identify how the proposed solution may or
may not achieve its target value with the interviewees. We then
refined the proposed solution based on the feedback received over
the course of three months. For example, based on user feedback
from government stakeholders, the project team shifted the
solution’s focus from integrating nongovernmental scientific
involvement in actual disaster response activities toward disaster
preparedness activities, e.g., table-top exercises. In addition to
phone interviews, one in-person, two-day workshop was held with
nine project advisors to refine the features of the solution, build
an implementation plan, and identify key benchmarks for its
implementation.  
The key stakeholders of the focus challenge were continuously
involved in the framing, brainstorming, and testing of our project
solutions. This method of “codesign” with users and stakeholders
is distinct from traditional processes of product design, where
interaction between the designer and user is discrete and limited.
We build on the definition of codesign given by Sanders and
Stappers (2009) to refer to the creative act of designers and people
not trained in design intentionally working together at multiple
points of the design development process. Codesign is a valuable
and important aspect of systems thinking, because it harnesses
the insights of users directly involved in the challenge that is being
addressed. In a systems solution, there is almost never a single
“end user,” instead, there are multiple stakeholders who will
interact with the solution. Designers must create distinct solution
features to effectively engage and generate value for these different
stakeholders. The complexity of this design space necessitates a
participatory approach where the users become coproducers of
viable solutions, and the design team takes the role of process
facilitators. This methodology builds upon the scholarship of
participatory design, which involves giving prototypes to
nondesigners and adaptively incorporating their feedback
(Björgvinsson et al. 2010). In the case of experience design, this
can be done through iteratively proposing new decision points
and revising the prototype to reflect differing stakeholder
experiences. The close involvement of the project advisors in our
design challenge—who are ultimately the users of the design
solution itself—is also an example of using participatory design
to ensure the outcome is grounded in the human needs and
realistic constraints of the challenge system.
RESULTS
Our targeted ethnography uncovered key insights about how
scientific collaboration is incentivized and motivated among
governmental decision makers and academic scientists. Through
interviews with key stakeholders, idea generation with project
advisors, and identification of desired project outcomes, we
identified a set of key system root causes and leverage points from
which we could address the problem.
Final challenge framing
We synthesized the challenge framings articulated by our
informants to narrow and refine the scope of the challenge.
Determining the final scope of the challenge framing is critical
because it determines the scope of the solution. Many
interviewees drew parallels between the challenges of
collaboration in marine oil spills and other environmental
disasters, thus we broadened our challenge framing to include a
broader set of environmental crises (chemical spills, rail-based oil
spills, hurricanes, tsunamis, and severe winter storms). Further,
we heard that many of the barriers to collaboration during
response were rooted in the obstacles to relationship-building and
communication that exist between crises, i.e., before and after
disasters occur. Thus, we extended our final challenge framing to
include the collaboration challenges that emerge before, during,
and after crises occur.
Design specifications
Our synthesis of ethnographic insights revealed a number of key
system characteristics that, if  achieved, may enable greater
scientific collaboration between our target users: academic
scientists and government agencies tasked with disaster
preparation and response activities. These characteristics served
as our design specifications as we generated potential solutions
to our design challenge. We included a qualitative analysis of these
design specifications when evaluating solutions for their impact,
feasibility, and scalability. Specifically, we analyzed the extent to
which the solution (1) builds trust between academia and the
government response community before a crisis occurs; (2) maps
to the existing motivations of target users by creating genuine and
tangible value on relevant time scales; (3) remains active between
crises to foster the relationships necessary to rapidly identify,
investigate, and communicate about scientific unknown
unknowns; and (4) decreases the effort (time and money)
responders must expend on engaging with academic scientists
during a response operation.
Root causes
The root cause map revealed 78 system attributes that drive
undesirable individual, institutional, or system behaviors relative
to our target outcomes. Of the 78 root causes mapped, 27 were
related to the leverage point of shifting mindsets, 23 were related
to material or information flows and their buffers (elements that
maintain system stability), 13 were related to feedback loops, 8
were related to changing system goals, and 7 were related to
changing the rules of the system. We found that the stakeholder
perceptions, particularly ones that were critical or unfavorable
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Table 2. The 20 leverage points most powerful for achieving our four target outcomes.
 
Leverage Point Description
The size of buffers Increased buffers around spill response research between spills, i.e., bolstering research interest between spills, rather than
punctuated interest only during spill events
Increased buffers around spill response research between spills, i.e., bolstering research interest between spills, rather than
punctuated interest only during spill events
The delay in the communication of research needs from responders to academic scientists during oil spills
The delay in mobilizing scientific resources, e.g., physical or intellectual, among key institutions to the spill site during oil
spills
The delay in finalizing scientific products due to processes assuring they meet scientific standards of quality (Quality
Assurance Quality Control) during spills
The lengths of delays,
relative to the rate of system
change
The delay in adaptive learning among agencies and academic scientists after response drills
The strength of negative
feedback loops
Media pressures on politicians, responders, and academics
The gain around driving
positive feedback loops
Journals create publication addendums to allow data sharing during crisis, e.g., Science and Nature allow the release of
nonpublished data, academics are incentivized to collaborate on data analysis
Rapid response grants for academic research were disseminated to scientists, leading to greater scientific understanding
and increased capacity to secure funding
Some scientists who became involved in the response efforts were able to build long-term relationships with responders,
leading to sustained collaboration
Mindsets and perceptions Stakeholders and the public discount disasters, underestimating the likelihood of their occurrence in the future
Stakeholders often have an assumption of no “unknown unknowns” before or during a response
Agency perception that staff  know what to do during a response and there is not a role for academics
Academic perception that their data will be used by decision makers if  it is produced, and it is not their responsibility to
translate it
In human-caused disasters, stakeholders often have a need for a scapegoat, e.g., blame and distrust of responders
because of relationship with the responsible party; there is not a sense of collective responsibility for an oil spill
Responders often have multiple objectives, e.g., mitigate oil spill or meet public expectations, whereas academics often
have a single objective, e.g., scientific discovery and publication
Agency mindset that disaster planning is not a collective responsibility across agencies
The rules of the system The Incident Command System and the Oil Spill Pollution Act, e.g., designation and role of the responsible party
Area, Regional, and National Contingency Plans
The National Resource Damage Assessment
regarding the values of other stakeholder groups, were impeding
collaboration and relationship building. For instance,
government administrators tend to operate with a mindset that
they know how to manage spills, without additional input from
academic scientists, and academic scientists tend to have a mindset
that their research will be used, regardless of their communication
and engagement of that research. We also found that extrinsic
forces, such as limited research funding for crisis science, legal and
contracting hurdles, and time constraints, exacerbate stakeholder
cultural conflicts.
Leverage points
Solution ideas were generated from How Might We statements
based on the 20 leverage points that were identified as uniquely
powerful in shifting crisis collaboration toward our 4 desired
outcomes (Table 2). The final project solution explicitly
incorporates features to use 16 leverage points to create tangible
and durable value for all system stakeholders. A full list of the 44
system leverage points identified for enabling system change can
be found in Appendix A1.3.
Prototyping
The multistakeholder prototyping workshop at the 2015 Gulf Oil
Spill and Ecosystem Science Conference was valuable for
provoking generative, productive exchanges between stakeholders
and identifying opportunities to improve the solution ideas by
creating additional mutual value. One-on-one user testing
interviews were also important for receiving targeted feedback on
specific solution components. We observed stakeholders adopting
a focused, creative mindset when given a tangible solution
prototype to interact with, as opposed to discussing solutions in
the abstract, a frequent pitfall of solution processes for complex
systemic challenges. The workshop and other small group
prototyping sessions also provided a space to initiate and
strengthen cross-stakeholder relationships important for solution
implementation.
Testing
The final solution selected by the internal planning team was the
Science Action Network, a community of academic and
professional scientists who are linked to regional government
planning and response bodies to coordinate and streamline
scientific input for decision making before and during disasters.
The Science Action Network would enable increased cross-
disaster preparedness and would support response decision
making through novel academic-agency partnerships, resource
sharing, and coordination of scientific input (see Table 3 for
descriptions of how the Science Action Network meets the project
design specifications).  
The project team selected the Science Action Network as the final
project solution based on prototyping feedback and our filtering
criteria (Table 4). Based on what we heard from key stakeholders
while testing the network’s potential value, we adapted the
network to be more heavily focused on precrisis relationship
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Table 3. Design specifications distilled from ethnography and how the final proposed solution, the Science Action Network, met those
specifications.
 
Design Specifications Solution Design
Builds trust between
academic scientists and the
response community before
a crisis occurs.
The primary purpose of the Science Action Network is to increase the levels of interaction, “connectedness,” and trust
between academic scientists and government administrators before crises occur. The recommended mechanisms to
achieve this include (a) regular scenario-based collaborative problem-solving roundtables and drills between responders
and academic scientists; (b) public recognition of academics’ service to the network through their institutions and
professional societies; (c) increased access to research funding opportunities for network members, through relationship
building and potential streamlined funding during crises; and (d) the establishment of an annual Science Action
Network national conference.
Maps to the existing
motivations of target users
by creating genuine and
tangible value on relevant
time scales.
The network produces compelling value for diverse stakeholders. Differences in the goals and incentives of academics,
responders, and industry are a major hindrance to effective collaboration. The Science Action Network strives to create
mutual value between these key stakeholders through collaborative resource sharing and joint access to information.
New or enhanced incentives for academic involvement in agency decision making through the network will lead to a
broader diversity of disciplinary and geographic expertise in planning and response. Trainings offered to network
members around preparedness and response research needs and disaster response protocols will increase the usability
and applicability of network research outputs, and enhance the cultural competency of both agency staff  and academics
to communicate and collaborate between and during crisis situations.
Remains active between
crises to foster the
relationships necessary to
rapidly identify, investigate,
and communicate about
scientific unknown
unknowns.
The network sustains participation through novel cross-hazard learning and exchange. Because large disasters such as
Deepwater Horizon happen relatively rarely, academic interest in disaster-relevant science wanes between incidents,
weakening academics’ ties with the response community. The network is flexed to prepare and respond to multiple types
of disasters: thus members will be engaged more frequently and across more disciplines.
Decreases the effort (time
and money) responders
must expend engaging with
academic scientists during a
response operation.
The network leverages and amplifies existing resources and competencies. Many existing solutions are informal and
customized to one institution, geography, or hazard type. The Science Action Network fills a critical gap not addressed
by existing strategies: it catalyzes interdisciplinary disaster-relevant research before incidents occur, ensures that the
research is integrated into response preparation, and streamlines decision makers’ access to necessary scientific expertise
during incidents. Academic scientists who apply to join the network are required to complete an orientation training that
will familiarize them with the (1) basic legal and organizational structure of federal and state response, and (2) the
critical cultural differences between academia and government agencies (and bridging strategies to use). Finally, the
network reduces the friction of searching for necessary expertise by utilizing existing disciplinary relationships within
academia to source the best science for scientific unknowns during crises. The network’s regional chapter structure is
designed to tap into the place-based knowledge and connections of academics at local institutions to inform decision
making and enhance agency efforts to build trust and clear communication with local communities impacted by a
disaster.
building through collaborative research and preparedness efforts.
Further, we refined the network structure to include both a
geographic organization (via 10 hubs) and a disciplinary
organization, e.g., academics in the field of crisis communication
connected across regions. A disciplinary structure enables liaisons
to streamline identification of disciplinary expertise necessary for
a particular incident, which may not exist locally. It also ensures
cross-pollination of key research priorities, opportunities, and
accomplishments across the network by piggybacking on existing
disciplinary social networks and professional societies.
DISCUSSION
Our methodology was well suited to address the complexity and
difficulty of our project challenge. The human-centered design
and systems thinking techniques we used uncovered the goals and
perceptions of our target users and informed a final solution that
is grounded in the real-world needs and behaviors of those that
have the potential to improve crisis decision making through
increased cross-sectoral scientific collaboration. We found that
stakeholders in the system of scientific decision making for
disasters have differing motivations to engage and, thus, partly
because of extrinsic forces such as funding and intrinsic forces of
culture, lack the trust necessary for collaboration or
communication in high-stakes contexts. These insights
illuminated both why there were collaboration successes and why
there were collaboration failures during Deepwater Horizon, and
provided a springboard for reimagining how we might create more
consistent, mutual value among stakeholders. Finally, our
codesign approach enabled rapid iteration on our key insights,
the generation of ideas grounded in the perceptions of the target
users, and greater buy-in to the final solution.  
Our ethnography uncovered goals, motivations, perceptions, and
structural barriers impeding consistent collaboration among our
target stakeholder groups before and during large, environmental
crises. First, a profound perception gap exists between academic
scientists and government administrators and responders, leading
to a missed opportunity of collaboration before, during, and after
a disaster event. Of the 82 root causes identified, the highest
proportion related to the entrenched mindsets and perceptions of
stakeholders regarding the role of science during response and
the value of sharing information across sectors (n = 27). This gap
in perceptions about the role of science in decision making,
expectations for collaboration, and the potential mutual value
that could be created among stakeholders hinders trust building.
The gap is exacerbated because the two groups have dramatically
different reward systems and priorities, which deepen the cultural
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Table 4. The criteria used to evaluate the project ideas and how the final proposed solution met those criteria.
 
Criteria Solution Design
Impact (creates significant
positive results across the
four desired outcomes).
The Science Action Network achieves impact by bridging cultural gaps between response agencies, industry, and
academic scientists to create new norms for scientific collaboration; driving disaster-relevant and interdisciplinary
scientific research through novel academic-agency partnerships and funding opportunities; and catalyzing cross-disaster
and cross-institutional scientific exchange.
Feasibility (effectively
implemented within 1—5
years with existing resources
and minimal funding).
The network will leverage existing institutional structures, e.g., regional preparedness and response interagency bodies,
while building new working relationships between academic scientists, government administrators, and government
scientists through full-time Network liaisons. The liaisons identify critical and efficient opportunities to collate relevant,
local research to inform timely crisis decision making.
Scalability (accounts for and
scales across hazard types).
The network will explore previously unseen shared challenges and science needs across disaster types. The network’s
proposed Lead Advisory Committee comprises representatives from each of the federal disaster preparation and
response agencies, multidisciplinary scientific professional societies, e.g., the American Association for the Advancement
of Science, and private industry sectors, e.g., extractive energy companies. This diverse composition from the onset helps
set up the network’s membership and focus activities to strategically grow across hazard types, rather than remaining
limited to only oil spills or hurricanes.
divide between them and weaken their willingness to engage
productively. We also found that extrinsic forces, such as limited
funding for rapid, opportunistic science during crises, legal
constraints around governmental data transparency or academic
contracting, and time constraints inherent to any crisis response,
all amplify cultural conflicts and impede the ability of
stakeholders to collaborate. By mapping how these forces affected
collaborative relationship building, we were able to pinpoint the
root causes of our challenge and craft a solution that addressed
both the structural barriers to collaboration, e.g., lack of
communication channels, and also the cultural barriers erected
by polarized mindsets, e.g., the mindset of some government staff
that there is no role for academic scientists in response decision
making.
Key insights gained from applying the Deep Change Method
Using the Deep Change Method, which combines human-
centered design and systems thinking techniques, to address our
complex project challenge revealed how these tools may have
broad relevancy to other socio-environmental challenges.
Complementing the traditional, assessment-based research
process with design methods and principles may be a powerful
approach for integrating the real-world human behaviors and
motivations of those affected by and/or driving system
interactions. Methodologically, we took away several key lessons.  
1. Combining both traditional human-centered design and
systems-oriented tools enabled more impactful and scalable
solutions. Human-centered design tools such as stakeholder
persona profiles increased stakeholders’ understanding of
each other’s motivations, constraints, and worldview, and
grounded solutions in real human needs. System thinking
tools such as leverage point analysis enabled efficient and
strategic convergence around key system behaviors that, if
shifted, would achieve our target outcomes. In a complex
system, both sets of tools are useful for characterizing
system dynamics influencing the problem, while also
empathizing with the stakeholders most salient to the design
challenge. 
2. Codesign is imperative when crafting systems-oriented
solutions. Moving beyond “engagement” with stakeholders
and toward participatory codesign was essential for
sculpting an impactful and feasible solution. Thus,
partnership between the neutral lead design team and an
active advisory team may improve solution viability.
Critically, the internal project team had creative control over
the idea generation and refinement process, which helped
ensure a “whole system,” focused solution, rather than one
tailored towards one or two powerful stakeholders. This was
particularly important given the easily politicized nature of
the challenge and the collective biasing of the project
outcomes if  any one of the target users was able to
disproportionately influence the design process. 
3. Prototyping system solutions requires human- and systems-
level testing. Experience prototypes must be tailored toward
individuals to test solution assumptions around stakeholder
perceptions and motivations. Prototypes must also test how
the solution influences system behavior. Story-based
multistakeholder prototyping (similar to role-playing)
facilitated the identification of key interaction points
between stakeholders and alternative pathways for
increasing value in stakeholder relationships. One-on-one
testing sessions with individual users were still valuable, but
group prototyping sessions were critical for illuminating
opportunities for generating mutual value and meeting
multiple stakeholder needs. Finally, the solution must be
rigorously tested with cross-sectoral groups to ensure it will
be implementable within the existing system of formal
political, economic, and legal structures, as well as
compatible with the implicit cultural norms of the various
stakeholder institutions. For example, testing the final
solution across interagency working groups was important
to restructure the Science Action Network to adhere to
existing legal boundaries around governmental collaboration
with nongovernmental bodies. 
4. A nonlinear problem-solving process is valuable when
tackling dynamic systems-level challenges. We flexibly
adapted our process to account for new insights about our
target users’ behavior throughout each phase. Design is an
art, dependent on the designers’ intuition for identifying key
system behaviors, framing the target problem, narrowing the
solution scope, and parsing out disproportionately
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impactful interventions to influence system behavior. The
normative nature of the design process can be difficult for
collaborators accustomed to assessment-based projects, e.g.,
most scientists, and we found that repeatedly regrounding our
decision in the insights we discovered in the ethnography
phase was critical for maintaining stakeholders’ trust in the
process and the final solutions.
Limitations
Design, by nature, is a flexible method that may look dramatically
different in theory and practice across problems. When seeking
solutions for complex system challenges, design processes
methodologically rely on the ability to prototype in real-world
conditions. If  the design team does not have access to end users or
real challenge scenarios to prototype ideas, the effectiveness of the
final solution is limited. In this case study, we were unable to test
the final solution in a real-world disaster context and our
prototyping was limited to likely scenarios and stakeholder
memories from past incidents. Future work would benefit from
testing our final solution during an actual event or interagency
table-top exercise. Finally, the field of human-centered design and
systems thinking can use language and tools that make it
impenetrable for stakeholders unfamiliar with the process. Thus,
it is critically important to involve stakeholders early, provide clear
definitions, and cocreate process goals to ensure buy-in and
meaningful participation from participants and codesigners alike.
Future research
The fields of human-centered design, systems thinking, and the
Deep Change Method are still nascent. Further research is
necessary for the enhancement of the credibility, usability, and
efficacy of the tools and processes used in this study. We outline
five dimensions of a research agenda that we believe are uniquely
valuable in advancing the theory and practice of complex systems
thinking.  
First, research is needed to understand how engaging stakeholders
from analogous challenge types, e.g., involving representatives
from medical crisis response, is useful in each phase of the design
process. Seeking inspiration from analogous challenges is a basic
innovation tool for designers because it seeds the process with new
ideas and helps ensure solutions scale to other contexts. In our
project, we conducted literature reviews and several conversations
in the fields of nuclear disaster management, public health
epidemics, and cybersecurity threats. However, we did not invite
stakeholders from any of those analogous sectors to participate as
core project advisors or as participants in project workshops. It
would be valuable to understand how such analog stakeholders or
experts influence the design process and the novelty of produced
solutions.  
Second, research is needed to test and identify additional
techniques for multistakeholder system prototyping. Creating a
tangible product or experience to represent a system intervention
is difficult and complex. More tools are needed for prototyping
systemic solutions, and to better understand their efficacy in testing
solution assumptions, both on the human and system scales.  
Third, codesign is becoming a more widely applied practice across
multiple fields, e.g., policy creation and urban planning, and
research is needed to test and compare codesign practice and
principles. Additionally, little is known about the long-term impact
of the participatory design process on stakeholders who
participate in it, both on their perceptions of the challenge and
the system, and of themselves and their own motivations.  
Fourth, there are few metrics for evaluating the diffuse and often
indirect impacts of system-oriented design solutions, as well as
holding the process and designers accountable for those impacts.
A designer often sees his or her work as done once the solution
proposal is finished, and is minimally involved with the process
of solution implementation. In complex systems, it is difficult to
assess the distributed effects of interventions. Designers need
methods for tracking impact of implemented solutions to both
assess the efficacy of their methods and to increase their
connectivity with stakeholders who are involved in or have been
affected by the implementation of their proposed solutions.  
Finally, because systems thinking tools and methods proliferate
across disciplines and problem contexts, research on the efficacy
of mixed qualitative and quantitative methods is needed. Design
is both an art and a science. A better understanding of how various
methodologies influence design outcomes would be valuable,
particularly as design metrics and standards for accountability
become formalized.
CONCLUSION
In this study we provide a framework for using design methods
in novel and diverse applications across the environmental and
social sector. Using oil spills as our focus case study, we
demonstrated the value of the Deep Change Method, which
combines human-centered design, behavioral psychology, and
systems thinking, for creating a systemic solution for scientific
collaboration during environmental crises. Codesign methods
created active buy-in from relevant stakeholder groups in the final
solution. Human relationships, organizational culture, and trust
were identified as critical barriers to collaboration by project
interviewees. Thus, human motivations and organizational
culture were centered in the final solution concepts. Most
problems are, at their root, caused or can be remedied by humans,
thus integrating human behavior and incentives in designing
solutions is critical for addressing them. And, finally, the final
solution is efficient and innovative by leveraging existing resources
and stakeholder motivations to generate new value for multiple
stakeholder groups. These outcomes demonstrate the potential
for the Deep Change Method to be applied across many complex
social and environmental problems. It is hoped that some of the
tools and insights discussed here serve as a foundation for
considering the system complexity that drives human challenges.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9246
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Appendix	1		
Table	A1.1:	Interview	guide	for	ethnography	phase.				1. What	is	your	position?	What	is	the	purpose	of	your	organization/agency?	2. Who	do	you	work	with	most	closely	in	your	position	(external	to	your	organization)?	3. What	was	the	process	by	which	you	became	involved	in	the	Deepwater	Horizon	spill	response?	Who	contacted	you?	What	was	the	turnaround	time	for	engagement?	4. During	the	spill,	what	did	a	typical	day	look	like	for	you?	Who	were	you	interacting	with	most	frequently?	What	types	of	decisions	did	you	have	to	make?	5. Can	you	tell	us	about	a	time	during	the	DWH	when	you	had	to	make	a	decision	but	you	weren’t	sure	what	to	do?	How	did	you	go	about	making	that	decision?	6. We	are	particularly	interested	in	how	information	and	ideas	were	communicated	during	the	spill.	Did	you	receive	or	request	information	during	the	spill	from	outside	your	department	or	division?	If	so,	what	types	of	information	and	who	did	you	receive	it	from?	
7. We	have	heard	from	other	people	we’ve	talked	to	about	spill	response	that	who	people	already	knew	and	worked	with	closely	before	the	spill	happened	greatly	impacted	what	their	response	effort	look	like	and	what	they	were	able	to	get	done.	Does	that	resonate	with	you?		8. What	role	do	you	think	trust	played	in	the	structure	and	effectiveness	of	the	response?	9. Who	do	you	wish	you	had	known/had	in	your	network	to	draw	on	during	to	the	spill?	10. In	the	ideal	future,	what	would	that	relationship	look	like	before	another	large-scale	spill	happens?	11. Do	you	think	that	we	are	more,	less,	or	equally	prepared	for	quickly	and	effectively	responding	to	a	large	oil	spill	crisis	now,	as	compared	with	before	the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	spill?	12. DWH	was	obviously	a	very	stressful	experience	for	everyone	involved.	What	was	an	example	of	success,	when	you	felt	proud	of	your	work?	13. How	and	when	were	you	recognized	or	rewarded	for	your	work?	14. Are	you	working	with	new	people	or	organizations	now	as	a	result	of	the	spill?	15. Did	your	job	responsibilities	or	expectations	change	as	a	result	of	DWH?	16. In	your	position,	how	did	you	utilize	science	during	the	spill?	Did	you	interact	with	scientists	directly?	If	so,	what	was	that	experience	like?	If	not,	how	did	you	receive	the	information	you	needed?	17. How	did	you	sort	through	or	make	sense	of	all	the	information	you	received?	18. Were	there	times	when	you	couldn’t	get	the	information,	data,	or	scientific	advice	that	you	needed?	19. This	project	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	finding	a	way	to	rapidly	and	efficiently	integrate	new	science	with	response	decisions	will	dramatically	improve	the	speed	and	effectiveness	of	large	oil	spill	management.	Do	you	agree	with	that	assumption?	Are	there	other	challenges	or	barriers	to	effective	response	that	you	would	place	as	higher	priority?	20. Thinking	about	the	potential	to	use	science	in	rapid	response	in	the	future,	what	would	be	your	ideal	setup?	21. What	is	preventing	that	ideal	from	being	a	reality?	22. If	you	had	a	billion	dollars	(and	the	executive	power),	what	are	two	critical	success	components	that	you	would	focus	on	to	ensure	effective	response	to	oil	spills	in	the	future?	23. Reflecting	on	this	conversation	and	your	experience,	what	were	some	key	takeaways	that	you	feel	you	learned	from	DWH	about	seeking	guidance	from	scientists	to	assist	decision-making	during	crises?	
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24. If	you	were	in	my	position,	looking	into	this	challenge	of	rapidly	integrating	science	into	the	effective	response	to	large	oil	spills,	what	additional	questions	would	you	be	asking?	What	are	we	missing?	25. Anything	else	you	want	to	say?		
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Figure	A1.1:	Persona	profile	template	used	to	distill	key	insights	about	our	four	primary	stakeholders.			
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Table	A1.2:	Hypothesized	leverage	points	in	the	system.			Delays	&	Lag	Times	in	the	System		
Description:	Key	time	delays	before	or	during	the	response	that	were	barriers	to	the	desired	
outcomes.	
Theory	Of	Change:	Reducing	the	lengths	of	these	delays	would	contribute	to	target	outcomes.	
	 1. The	delay	in	the	communication	of	research	needs	from	responders	to	academic	scientists	during	oil	spills	2. The	delay	in	mobilizing	scientific	resources	(e.g.,	physical	or	intellectual)	among	key	institutions	to	the	spill	site	during	oil	spills	3. The	delay	in	finalizing	scientific	products	due	to	QAQC	processes	during	spills	4. The	delay	in	adaptive	learning	among	agencies	and	non-governmental	scientists	after	response	drills		5. The	(possible)	delay	in	adaptive	learning	among	agencies	and	non-governmental	scientists	after	small	or	large	spills		6. The	delay	in	the	publication	of	science	conducted	before,	during,	or	after	spills	in	academic	journals		The	Size	of	Buffers		
Description:	Buffers,	which	resist	or	help	to	moderate	change	within	a	system,	maintain	system	
stability	and	dampen	oscillations.		
Theory	of	Change:	Depending	on	your	goals,	increasing	or	decreasing	the	size	of	current	
buffers	can	push	system	behavior	towards	desired	outcomes.	
	 1. Increased	buffers	around	spill	response	research	between	spills	(i.e.,	bolstering	research	interest	between	spills,	rather	than	punctuated	interest	only	during	spill	events)		2. Increased	buffers	between	data	collection	(and	scientific	process	generally)	and	media	pressure	to	publish	results	before	adequate	QAQC		3. Decreased	cultural	buffer	between	political	appointees	vs.	government	veterans	that	have	risen	through	the	ranks	4. Decreased	physical	buffer	between	local	communities	and	federal	responders	during	spills		5. Decreased	buffer	between	the	beginning	of	the	spill	and	scientific	grantmaking	(e.g.,	rapid	response	grants)	6. Decreased	buffer	around	procedural	action	during	spills	(e.g.,	interagency	administration,	appropriations,	etc.)		Feedback	Loops		
Description:	Positive	and	negative	feedback	loops	before	and	during	the	response	that	helped	
or	hindered	the	desired	outcomes.	
Theory	Of	Change:	Enhancing	desirable	positive	feedback	loops	will	create	desired	outcomes;	
minimizing	undesired	feedback	loops	will	create	desired	outcomes.		
		Cycles	that	reinforce	time	constraints	(goal	would	be	to	slow/reduce	these):		
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1. Media	pressures	on	politicians,	responders,	and	academics	(i.e.,	engagement	with	media	takes	away	time	from	response	and	research,	but	lack	of	engagement	compounds	public	pressure)	2. Demands	or	concerns	of	federal	politicians	(e.g.,	limited	understanding	of	the	Incident	Command	System	(ICS)	structure	leads	to	political	demands	on	response	decisionmakers,	which	in	turn	reinforces	involvement	by	politicians)	3. Scientists	quickly	becoming	spokespeople	on	public-facing	scientific	issues	(e.g.,	once	scientists	are	quoted	in	an	article,	the	media	increasingly	identify	those	scientists	as	sources	willing	to	speak	out,	potentially	reinforcing	particular	perspectives	and	voices)			Cycles	that	enhance	the	speed	of	response	activities	(goal	would	be	to	amplify	these):	1. Journals	create	publication	addendums	to	allow	data	sharing	(e.g.,	Science	and	Nature	allow	the	release	of	non-published	data,	academics	are	incentivized	to	collaborate	on	data	analysis)		2. Rapid	response	grants	for	academic	research	were	disseminated	to	scientists,	leading	to	greater	scientific	understanding	and	increased	capacity	to	secure	funding	3. Some	scientists	who	became	involved	in	the	response	efforts	were	able	to	build	long-term	relationships	with	government	responders,	leading	to	sustained	collaboration		4. Agencies	create	new	communication	protocols	to	streamline	intra-agency	communications	(i.e.,	mechanisms	to	transcend	bureaucratic	hurdles	within	agencies	during	crises)	5. Information	relevant	to	human	health	was	efficiently	and	effectively	communicated	to	decisionmakers				Rules	of	the	System	
Description:	Governing	rules	of	the	system	across	geographies	and	time	scales.	
Theory	Of	Change:	Shifting	or	tweaking	the	governing	rules	has	cascading	effects	on	resource	
allocation	and	system	behavior.	
	 1. The	Incident	Command	System	(e.g.,	designation	and	role	of	the	Responsible	Party)	2. Area,	Regional,	and	National	Contingency	Plans	3. The	National	Restoration	and	Damage	Assessment		4. The	tenure	system	as	the	reward	structure	for	academia	(e.g.,	academics	are	rewarded	individually	for	their	work,	publications	valued	over	service)	5. The	Oil	Pollution	Act	(e.g.,	funding	mechanisms)	6. The	jurisdictional	boundaries	of	U.S.	law,	which	influence	spill	cleanup	and	restoration	decisions	7. Fishery	regulations	that	influence	spill	cleanup	and	restoration	decisions	8. Agency	staff	reward	structures	(e.g.,	staff	are	often	rewarded	by	their	length	of	service,	which	influences	decisionmaking	within	agencies)	9. The	implicit	authority	federal	politicians	can	exert	over	agency	decisionmaking	during	crises	(e.g.,	politician	interests	can	trump	Incident	Commander	decisions	by	intrinsic	power	structures)		10. The	government’s	annual	fiscal	cycle,	which	can	influence	resource	allocation	and	capacity			
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Mindsets	and	Perceptions		
Description:	Mindsets	held	by	key	stakeholders	that	deeply	inform	their	behavior.	
Theory	Of	Change:	If	we	can	change	the	defining	mindset	of	a	key	stakeholder,	their	behavior	
in	the	system	will	also	change	(if	they	have	the	external	agency	to	make	that	change).		 1. All	stakeholders	and	the	public	hyperbolically	discount	disasters	2. All	stakeholders	often	have	an	assumption	of	no	“unknown	unknowns”	before	or	during	a	response		3. Agency	perception	that	staff	know	what	to	do	during	a	response	and	there	is	not	a	role	for	academics	4. Academic	perception	that	research,	if	informed	by	applied	needs,	is	biased	5. Academic	perception	that	their	data	will	be	used	by	decisionmakers	if	it	is	produced,	and	it	is	not	their	responsibility	to	translate	it	6. In	human-caused	disasters,	all	stakeholders	often	have	a	need	for	a	scapegoat	(e.g.,	blame	and	distrust	of	government	responders	due	to	relationship	with	R.P.);	there	is	no	sense	of	collective	responsibility	for	an	oil	spill	occurring	7. Agency	responders	often	have	multiple	objectives	(e.g.,	mitigate	oil	spill,	meet	public	expectations),	whereas	academics	often	have	a	single	objective	(e.g.,	scientific	discovery	and	publication)	8. Agency	mindset	that	disaster	planning	is	not	a	collective	responsibility	across	agencies	9. Responder	mindset	of	a	bias	towards	action,	whereas	academics	are	often	biased	towards	scientific	precision	10. Academic	mindset	and	desire	for	their	research	to	have	social	relevance		Goals	of	the	System	
Description:	Intrinsic	goals	of	the	system	that	drive	system	behavior.	
Theory	Of	Change:	If	we	can	change	the	goals	of	the	system	towards	our	desired	outcomes,	
systemic	change	will	occur.		 1. Increase	scientific	understanding	of	the	human	and	natural	environment	2. Enforce	a	system	of	putative	accountability	3. Extract	oil		4. Maintain	human	and	environmental	well-being			
